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SECURITY, LOYALTY AND SCIENCE. By Walter Gellhorn. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 1950. Pp. 300. $3.00.
Modern warfare is fought with weapons of science. In our fear we seek
to increase our. own scientific arsenals and at the same time not to provide
weapons for the enemy. We ha1e created an elaborate structure of security
regulations in an attempt to cast an iron curtan of secrecy around many areas
of knowledge and to conceal many new discoveries which might be of value
to any enemy in wartime. Professor Gellhorn, in this readable and well-docu-
mented book, has described with disturbing frankness the results of that effort,
and has suggested changes which must be made if we are to survive as a
free nation.
Although this book is written for the layman, it is a lawyer's study of legal
devices created to meet a new and pressing problem. Therefore, it has pointed
lessons for the lawyer - lessons so obvious but so often forgotten.
Professor Gellhorn first makes clear that laudable purposes do not make
laws proper, for good motivation is no substitute for good sense. The lawyer
in devising legal controls must fully understand the whole structure of activity
which he is attempting to regulate - its institutional setting, its social patterns,
and its technological methods. Otherwise his efforts may be self-defeating
of not dangerous. The desire to keep sale valuable military secrets is praise-
worthy, but the author reminds us that in the field of scientific research we can
keep no secrets, for our discoveries can be duplicated by other countries. Con-
tinued advantage in science can be assured only by continued progress at a
high rate; but that very progress has been stifled by over-cautious security
regulations which ignore the needs of scientific procedures. To preserve
secrecy scientists have been restricted in their free interchange of ideas and
sharing of secrets, they have been barred from knowing important discoveries
in other fields, have been kept in ignorance of critical information concerning
their own work, and have been compelled to duplicate extensive research
already performed by others. In the name of security embarrassing mistakes
are concealed and unsound theories go uncriticized. Security becomes stag-
nation, for science withers under secrecy.
The network of secrecy rules further hinder important government re-
search by unwittingly excluding those who are most needed. The most brilliant
scientists are reluctant to work where free interchange of knowledge is blocked
at every turn, creative minds shun the atmosphere of secrecy and suspicion,
and young men hesitate to bury themselves in projects where they can obtain
no recognition by publishing their findings. The author points out that in some
areas even the basic education of potential scientists is barred because no
adequate courses on such subjects as atomic physics or nuclear engineering
can be taught without revealing classified information. As a result, government
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laboratories go short-handed while the best scientific minds turn to the free
areas of science.
Our pattern of control, created to maintain our supremacy, bears a melan-
choly resemblance to the pattern by which Germany in ten years lost her world
leadership in scientific development. If we fail to realize that scientific secrets
can not long be secure, and if -we refused to recognize that secrecy can handi-
cap us more than the enemy, the very rules made to provide security may pave
our road to destruction.
The second important lesson for lawyers is that procedural safeguards are
not a lawyer's luxury but a practical necessity. The elementary rights to know
the charges, hear the evidence, and cross-examine the witnesses are essential
to test the weight and worth of the evidnce. These basic safeguards which not
only protect the accused from injustice but save the tribunal from error have
been ignored in the name of security. Persons who work on secret projects
or need access to classified material must be "cleared." They are first investi-
gated by the FBI and the file thus collected is evaluated by security officers or
boards. If clearance is denied to a new employee the matter is ended. No
charges are stated, no hearing is held, and no appeal is possible. If clearance
is withdrawn from an old employee, he can appeal and obtain a hearing, but
he appeals against a closed file containing undisclosed evidence given by un-
specified persons obtained by prosecution minded investigators. No wonder
that men of unquestioned integrity such as Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, or Roger Baldwin, Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union were declared to be poor security risks by such a procedure.
The danger of poor procedure is directly proportionate to the vagueness of the
facts to be determined. Where charges are of "disloyalty," "subversive associa-
tions," or "lack of integrity," the need for safeguards is multiplied a hundred-
fold. But it is here that they are most flagrantly denied.
The cost of poor procedure in security administration goes far beyond the
individual injustice suffered. The nation also suffers, for it loses the services
of valuable talent. The greatest loss is not in those who are denied clearance
but in those who refuse to apply. Scientists who realize that they may be the
innocent victim of malicious gossip or distorted facts reflected in a closed file
will not risk a denial of clearance which can brand them for life and blight
their whole career.
Fair procedure does not prevent the detection of spies, but bad procedure
can work injustice, create a stifling air of fear, and drive away the very men
most needed. Unless changes are made which will restore the essential safe-
guards of due process, the whole objective may be defeated.
The third lesson for lawyers is that infringements on freedom have a
deadly contagion. Professor Gellhorn dramatically demonstrates that security
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controls, unless closely confined within small isolated areas, disease all they
touch. Secrecy has spread from atomic weapons and bacteriological warfare
to new steel alloys and disinfectants. Clearance required of scientists working
on secret data has been indiscriminately extended to laborers who have no
contact with classified information. Universities operating research projects
are darkened by the shroud of secrecy and must comb their faculties and
students for "poor security risks." Industrial plants producing military equip-
ment may be caught in the net and asked to discharge employees whose FBI
dossiers create mild suspicion. Security regulations and their blood-brothers,
the loyalty programs, first enforced to protect vital areas, now threaten to
spread into every laboratory, every school, every factory, and every organiza-
tion. The author makes clear the grave danger, that in the name of security we
shall ourselves create the very garrison state from which we seek to be secure.
These three lessons are patently obvious to any lawyer or student of gov-
ernment. That they have been forgotten is a disturbing comment on the
hysteria of our days. Professor Gellhorn, however, has not limited himself to
pointing out these weaknesses in our present security system. He has recom-
mended constructive changes which will keep secure th necessary secrets and
yet maintain the freedom which is essential for our science and our culture.
These recommendations reflect his thorough study of the special problems
involved, his extensive knowledge of administrative procedures, and his deep
devotion to democratic rights.
This book should be required reading for every lawyer, every scientist,
every columnist and every Congressman. It is a penetrating study of one of
the most pressing problems of our day. If we do not find a sound solution
for that problem we shall lose both our scientific leadership and our freedom.
Clyde W. Summers
Associate Professor of Law
University of Buffalo.
